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In modern America, race relations continue to play a significant 
role in national news and the enforcement of the laws.  Equality is 
oftentimes a game of multifaceted tug of war in which there is constantly 
a struggle for the rights of differing races, ethnicities, and genders.  The 
foundation of knowledge and success in America is its educational 
system. At the forefront of the educational system are the admissions 
policies for each academic institution, which include the basis for the 
types of students desired by each institution.  Several factors are weighed 
in admission processes, including academic achievement, extracurricular 
involvement, and racial and socioeconomic backgrounds.  In Fisher v. 
University of Texas, the United States Supreme Court determined that the 
University of Texas (“the University”), which reviewed each applicant’s 
race in consideration of granting admission, was not violating the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by doing so.1  In a 
country that promotes equality and fairness, should race even be a part of 
a college application?  Should the Supreme Court have ruled in this 
manner?  
In Fisher, the Court held that the University had identified 
sufficient compelling interests in its goals for a diverse student body, that 
those interests had not yet been met, that the interests were narrowly 
tailored to achieve its goals, and that there were no better race-neutral 
alternatives to the methods it had been employing.2  After ruling on those 
four issues, the Court concluded that the University was not violating the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in reviewing race 
in its admissions process.3  In their dissent, Justice Alito and Justice 
Thomas detailed how the Court in Fisher mistakenly catered to the 
University in its application of strict scrutiny review by allowing the 
school to tiptoe around the difficulty of the standard.4  
 
    * J.D., Class of 2020, Mississippi College School of Law. I would like to 
thank Professor Christoph Henkel for his constant encouragement and insight during this 
process. 
    1. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). 
    2. Id.   
    3. Id. 
    4. Id. at 2215.  
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In this Note, I argue: (1) that the review of race in an admissions 
process results in a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, (2) that 
Fisher should have been ruled differently, and (3) for a new outlook on 
how an admissions system should be in its focus on the “educational 
benefits of diversity.”  Part II will cover the background facts and 
procedural history on the instant case, as well as a descriptive history of 
the progression of the relevant laws and an explanation of the Court’s 
decision in Fisher.5  Part III will discuss how the Court should have ruled, 
and it will bring forth suggestions for how the University should mold its 
admissions program in a manner that rewards not only academic success, 
but extracurricular activities and achievements as well.  In doing this, the 
University should keep the Equal Protection Clause as its foundation, 
remembering its plain meaning, and avoiding the weighing of racial 




A. Facts and Procedural History 
 
 The University of Texas at Austin (“University”) utilizes an 
admissions system that is comprised of two components.6  The first 
component, Texas’s Top Ten Percent Law (implemented by the 
University in 1998), requires the admission of any student who graduates 
from a Texas high school in the top 10% of his or her class.7  The second 
component, which fills the remaining spots in the freshman class, involves 
the combination of each applicant’s “Academic Index” and “Personal 
Achievement Index.”8  The “Academic Index” is made up of the student’s 
SAT score and high school academic performance, while the “Personal 
Achievement Index” is a comprehensive review of numerous factors, 
including the student’s race.9  
 Abigail Fisher, a Caucasian applicant, was not in the top 10% of 
her high school class.10   Her application was reviewed under the 
“Academic Index” and “Personal Achievement Index” lens, and she was 
denied admission to the University’s 2008 freshman class.11  Fisher filed 
suit, arguing that by considering race as a part of the holistic-review 
process, the University disadvantaged her and other Caucasian applicants, 
 
       5. Fisher, 136 S. Ct. 2198. 
    6. Id.  
    7. Id.  
    8. Id.  
    9. Id.  
  10. Id.  
  11. Id.  
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in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.12  
 The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas 
granted summary judgment in favor of the University, and the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.13  Because the Court of Appeals 
applied an “overly deferential” good-faith standard in assessing the 
constitutionality of the University’s admissions program, the Supreme 
Court of the United States granted certiorari and vacated the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals.14  The case was remanded to assess the claims under 
a more appropriate standard, and the Court of Appeals once again 
affirmed summary judgment in the University’s favor.15  The Supreme 
Court of the United States again granted certiorari, and finally affirmed 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals.16 
 
B. Background and History of the Law 
 
 Texas’s Top Ten Percent Law and the rulings from the Grutter and 
Gratz cases eventually influenced the University’s admissions program to 
consist of what was in place at the time of Fisher, but the program went 
through an evolution on its way to the instant case.  In Grutter v. 
Bollinger, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause did not prohibit 
the University of Michigan’s law school from the narrowly tailored use of 
race in its admissions process in furthering the compelling interest of 
diversity.17  In Gratz v. Bollinger, it was held that the University of 
Michigan’s admissions process was not narrowly tailored because it 
resulted in the admission of nearly every “underrepresented” minority.18  
A series of past cases led to three controlling principles set by the District 
Court’s hearing of Fisher, which were evaluated and decided upon in the 
case at hand.  This section discusses the evolution of the admissions 
program as well as the case law leading up to the instant case.  
 
1. History of the Admissions System    
 
 Up until 1996, the admissions decisions made by the University 
were based solely on an “Academic Index,” which combines an 
applicant’s SAT score with his or her high school academic 
 
  12. Id.  
  13. Id.  
  14. Id. at 2207.  
  15. Id.  
  16. Id.  
  17. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 307 (2003).  
  18. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 S. Ct. 244, 246 (2003). 
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performance.19  Racial minorities were given preference amidst this 
process.20  In the Hopwood v. Texas case of 1996, the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit held that the consideration of race in admissions 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.21  In 
response, the University began combining each applicant’s Academic 
Index with his or her “Personal Achievement Index,” which is a numerical 
score based on a holistic review of an applicant’s essays, experience, 
activities, community service, and other “special characteristics.”22  The 
Texas Legislature had its own response to Hopwood—it enacted the Top 
Ten Percent Law, which guarantees admission to any public university in 
the state to any student who graduates from a Texas high school in the top 
ten percent of his or her class.23  In 1998, the University implemented the 
Top Ten Percent Law and, after filling every spot with qualifying 
students, filled the remaining spots using its system involving the 
Academic and Personal Achievement Indexes.24  The University used this 
admissions system until 2003 and the arrival of the Grutter and Gratz 
cases, which altered its strategy.25  
 
2. Grutter and Gratz—Evolution of the Admissions System  
 
 In Gratz v. Bollinger, the Court reprimanded the University of 
Michigan’s admissions system for its predetermination of points toward 
racial minority applicants.26  Grutter v. Bollinger, on the other hand, dealt 
with the University of Michigan Law School’s admissions program.27  In 
Grutter, the Court held that its holistic review system, which only used 
race as a broad component of an application, was appropriate.28  In doing 
so, the Court overruled the holding in Hopwood that any consideration of 
race in admissions violated the Equal Protection Clause.29  Following 
Grutter, the University was faced with the issue of whether its admissions 
policy was allowing it to provide “the educational benefits of a diverse 
student body . . . to all of the University’s undergraduate students.”30  
 
  19. Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2205.  
  20. Id.  
  21. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 935 (5th Cir. 1996).  
  22. Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2205.  
  23. Id.  
  24. Id.  
  25. Id.  
  26. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 S. Ct. 244, 246 (2003). 
  27. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 309 (2003).  
  28. Id.  
  29. Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2205.  
  30. Id. at 2205-06.  
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After determining that it was not providing those benefits, the University 
submitted a request to the Board of Regents to begin taking race into 
consideration as one of “the many ways in which [an] academically 
qualified individual might contribute to, and benefit from, the rich, 
diverse, and challenging educational environment of the University.”31  
Stemming from this is the admissions policy that the University still uses 
to this day.32 
 The new policy implemented by the University was the result of 
Grutter, but it was not developed using the exact framework specified by 
the case.33  Today, the University fills up to 75 percent of its incoming 
freshman class using the Top Ten Percent Plan.34  While it did not adopt 
an identical policy to that of Grutter for filling the majority of its classes, 
the University did adopt a similar policy to fill the remaining 25 percent 
of its incoming freshman class by evaluating the previously mentioned 
Academic and Personal Achievement Indexes.35  However, the Personal 
Achievement Index began using race as a “subfactor” by analyzing the 
potential contributions made by an applicant based on his or her 
experiences, activities, and other “special circumstances.”36  These 
“special circumstances” include socioeconomic situations of the 
applicants and many other factors, including race.37  The decision makers 
over these applications undergo extensive training to make sure to 
maintain consistency in their evaluations.38 
 
3. Fisher I’s Controlling Principles 
 
The admissions system at the University in 2008 resulted in the 
lawsuit by Abigail Fisher, in which she alleged that the University’s 
consideration of race in its application process violated the Equal 
Protection Clause.39  After the District Court granted summary judgment 
in favor of the University, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of 
Fisher I.40  The decision was then vacated, remanded, affirmed, and 
 
  31. Id. at 2206.  
  32. Id.  
  33. Id.  
  34. Id.  
  35. Id.  
  36. Id.  
  37. Id.  
  38. Id.  
  39. Fisher, 136 S. Ct. 2198. 
  40. Id.  
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certiorari was granted before the instant case, but not before some key 
controlling principles were laid out by Fisher I.41  
 Relevant to the issue in the instant case are three controlling 
principles from Fisher I.42  First, “because racial characteristics so seldom 
provide a relevant basis for disparate treatment, [r]ace may not be 
considered [by a university] unless the admissions process can withstand 
strict scrutiny.”43  “Strict scrutiny” requires the University to clearly show 
that its purpose is both “constitutionally permissible and substantial, and 
that its use of the classification is necessary      . . . to the accomplishment 
of its purpose.”44  Second, “the decision to pursue ‘the educational 
benefits that flow from student body diversity’” is an “academic judgment 
to which some, but not complete, judicial deference is proper.”45  A quota 
cannot be established for a particular race or group of people, but once a 
university gives a reasoned explanation for its decision, “deference must 
be given to the University’s conclusion.”46  Third, “no deference is owed 
when determining whether the use of race is narrowly tailored to achieve 
the university’s permissible goals.”47  A university must prove that “race-
neutral alternatives” that are both “available” and “workable” “do not 
suffice” to promote its purpose.48  After much deliberation, the Court of 
Appeals determined that the University’s admissions program “conformed 
with the strict scrutiny mandated by Fisher I.”49  
 
C. The Instant Case 
 
 In an attempt to have the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
reversed, Fisher made four arguments: (1) that the University has not 
expressed its interest with clarity, (2) that the University has no need to 
consider race, (3) that considering race was not necessary because it 
merely has a “minimal impact” in advancing the University’s interest, and 





  41. Id.  
  42. Id. at 2207-08.  
  43. Id. at 2208.  
  44. Id.  
  45. Id.  
  46. Id.  
  47. Id.  
  48. Id.  
  49. Id.  
  50. Id. at 2210-12.  
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1. Majority Holding 
 
 In her first argument, Fisher claimed that the University did not 
specifically express its compelling interest with enough care.51  She 
emphasized that, without clarifying its end goal, the University could not 
possibly have its admissions program reviewed by a court to determine 
whether its program was “narrowly tailored” to that goal.52  The Court 
prefaced its holding on this matter by determining that a university may 
implement a race-conscious admissions program as a means of obtaining 
“the educational benefits that flow from student body diversity,” rather 
than for the purpose of obtaining a specific enrollment of minority 
students.53  According to the Court, those benefits could be achieved by 
increasing minority enrollment, but the increase in minority enrollment 
cannot be something put into a number-oriented goal, as Fisher seemed to 
suggest.54  However, the Court noted, a university’s educational goals 
cannot be so broad and vague that they cannot be measured.55  Referring 
to the record, the Court declared that the University “articulated concrete 
and precise goals” when it implemented its policy at the time.56  Citing 
specific language in the University’s admissions policy, the Court noted 
that the University identified educational values it wished to realize 
through its admissions process: “promotion of cross-racial understanding” 
and preparation of students “for an increasingly diverse workforce and 
society.”57  These objectives, the Court reiterated, directly resembled a 
“compelling interest” as approved in past cases.58  Citing the record as its 
main basis for rebuttal of Fisher’s first contention, the Court denied her 
argument that the University’s compelling interests were not specified 
enough.59  
 Fisher’s second argument was that the University had no need to 
consider race in its admissions because it had already “achieved critical 
mass” by 2003 using the Top Ten Percent Plan and the race-inclusive 
review of applicants.60  She also argued that the University bore the 
burden of proving it had not acquired the educational benefits of diversity 
 
  51. Id. at 2210.  
  52. Id.  
  53. Id.  
  54. Id.  
  55. Id. at 2211.  
  56. Id.  
  57. Id. 
  58. Id. 
  59. Id. 
  60. Id. 
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before turning to a race-inclusive plan.61  Although this is true, the Court 
noted, the University did prove that it had not yet obtained the benefits by 
conducting months of studies and data review and ultimately concluded 
that using race-neutral policies and programs did not help achieve racial 
diversity at the school.62  Citing once again to the record, the Court 
referenced both statistical and anecdotal data that showed a lack of growth 
in minority enrollment.63  In denying Fisher’s second argument, the Court 
noted that although a college has the duty to constantly reconsider a race-
inclusive review of its applicants, the University in this case had done its 
due diligence and still determined that its goals of diversity had not yet 
been met.64  
 In her third argument, Fisher claimed that considering race was 
unnecessary because it had only a “minimal impact” in furthering the 
compelling interest of the University.65  The Court determined that this 
contention was unsupported.66  By referencing the massive increase in 
Hispanic and African-American enrollees between 2003 and 2007, the 
Court held that the consideration of race had had a limited, but significant, 
effect on the diversity of the University’s freshman class.67  Although race 
consciousness had a limited effect on the admissions process, the Court 
noted it should be viewed as the University’s effort to narrowly tailor its 
compelling interests, rather than acting unconstitutionally.68  
 The final argument made by Fisher was that the University’s 
compelling interest could have been achieved through a multitude of other 
race-neutral methods.69  However, the Court determined that, at the time 
of her application, none of her suggested alternatives were “workable 
means for the University to attain the benefits of diversity it sought.”70  
One suggestion by Fisher was that the University increase its efforts in 
outreach to African-American and Hispanic applicants.71  But, the 
University had already done so by creating new scholarship programs and 
opening new admission centers.72  In addition, the University previously 
spent seven years trying to achieve its compelling interest by means of a 
 
  61. Id. 
  62. Id. 
  63. Id. at 2212.  
  64. Id.  
  65. Id.  
  66. Id.  
  67. Id.  
  68. Id.  
  69. Id.  
  70. Id.  
  71. Id. at 2213.  
  72. Id.  
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race-neutral review and was unsuccessful.73 Another suggestion given by 
Fisher was that the University should alter the weight given to academic 
and socioeconomic factors in its admissions.74  However, the Court noted 
she ignored the fact that an “enhanced” consideration of socioeconomic 
(and other) factors had already been attempted by the school.75  Fisher’s 
last suggestion was that the University should uncap the Top Ten Percent 
Plan and admit more students through a percentage plan.76  The Court 
reiterated that the plan’s purpose was to encourage minority enrollment.77  
In the past, percentage plans had been “adopted with racially segregated 
neighborhoods and schools front and center,” giving the Court reason to 
uphold that “it is race consciousness, not blindness to race, that drives 
such plans.”78  To strengthen its response, the Court discussed that even if 
class rank was the primary standard in admission, admitting students 
based on rank alone excludes those students who spent much of their high 
school careers doing extracurricular activities, such as playing sports or 
music.79  “Class rank is a single metric and, like any single metric, it will 
capture certain types of people and miss others.”80   
 The Court concluded its denial of Fisher’s final argument by 
stating that none of the suggested alternatives to meeting the University’s 
educational goals were “available” or “workable,” and that the University 
had met its burden of showing that its admissions policy was “narrowly 
tailored” at the time of Fisher’s application.81  This was the key to the 
University justifying its use of race in the admissions process.  The 
Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the prior judgment of the 
Court of Appeals but made sure to provide that it is the University’s 
“ongoing obligation” to make sure its admissions policies are current and 
appropriate.82  
 
2. Dissent  
 
 In quite a lengthy dissent, Justice Alito and Justice Thomas laid 
out the specific ways in which the Court could have ruled differently 
regarding its avoidance of traditional strict scrutiny review.  Justice Alito 
 
  73. Id.  
  74. Id. 
  75. Id. 
  76. Id. 
  77. Id. 
  78. Id. 
  79. Id. 
  80. Id. 
  81. Id. at 2214.  
  82. Id. at 2215.  
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recalled the initial decision in the Fisher I case in which the Court held 
that strict scrutiny required the University to show that reviewing race and 
ethnicity in its admissions process served compelling interests, and that its 
admissions plan was narrowly tailored to achieve those interests.83  On 
remand, the University never met those requirements.84  To this day, 
according to Justice Alito, the University has yet to identify with any 
specificity the interests that are supposed to be served through the review 
of race and ethnicity in its admissions process.85  By building on these 
points, Justice Alito and Justice Thomas explained in-depth how the Court 
in Fisher: (1) should not have ruled that the University passed strict 
scrutiny and (2) how the Court tiptoed around the normal standard of strict 
scrutiny review in order to cater to the University.86  
 Justice Alito first contended that the University’s race-conscious 
admissions program could not satisfy strict scrutiny because it failed to 
define its interest in furthering the educational benefits of diversity.87  He 
also said that the University failed to narrowly tailor its program to 
achieve its interest, which is required under strict scrutiny.88  He began 
these claims by referring to the Equal Protection Clause and by citing the 
Miller opinion, which profoundly stated that “[A]t the heart of the 
Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that 
the Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply 
components of a racial, religious, sexual, or national class.”89   He quoted 
another case which said, “[D]istinctions between citizens solely because 
of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people.”90  
Justice Alito reiterated his stance that individuals should be treated as 
humans, not as byproducts of different groups of people.  
When the University adopted its policy, according to Justice Alito, 
it “characterized its compelling interest as obtaining a ‘critical mass’ of 
underrepresented minorities.”91  Yet, the University failed to define what 
it meant by “critical mass”—it only determined that it is not an absolute 
number.92  This caused Justice Alito to infer that the University wanted to 
keep it on a “we’ll let you know when we see it” basis, in which there was 
 
  83. Id.  
  84. Id.  
  85. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting).  
  86. Id.  
  87. Id. at 2220.  
  88. Id.  
  89. Id at 2221 (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995)). 
  90. Id. (quoting Rice v. Cayetano, 120 S. Ct. 1044 (2000)). 
  91. Id.  
  92. Id.  
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no real way of measuring whether its goals had been achieved.93  For this 
reason, the University’s goals could not be determined, in Justice Alito’s 
opinion, to be “concrete.”94  Although the University  gave nothing but a 
vague interest determination in defining its goals, it identified four more 
specific goals: demographic parity, classroom diversity, intraracial 
diversity, and avoiding racial isolation.95 It was never determined by the 
majority or the University whether even these specific goals could survive 
strict scrutiny.96  
Regarding the first goal, Justice Alito said, “[I]f a demographic 
discrepancy can serve as a gauge that justifies the use of racial 
discrimination, then racial discrimination can be justified on that basis 
until demographic parity is reached.”97  Thus, he says, this goal cannot be 
used to satisfy strict scrutiny.98  The second goal, classroom diversity, 
could not have been used to satisfy strict scrutiny either because, once 
again, the University failed to identify a level of classroom diversity that it 
sought to be sufficient.99  The third goal, intraracial diversity, also failed 
because it relies on the assumption that there is something wrong with the 
African-Americans and Hispanics being admitted through the race-neutral 
Top Ten Percent Plan.100  The assumption is that the minorities being 
granted admission through the plan are coming from “lower-performing, 
radically identifiable schools.”101  Lastly, the University claimed an 
interest in avoiding feelings of isolation in minorities.102  Because of the 
vagueness of this goal, it could not possibly satisfy strict scrutiny, as it 
cannot be measured.103 
 Justice Alito’s second major point addressed  the Court’s three 
reasons for avoiding the application of the normal strict scrutiny standard 
in Fisher.104  First, he quoted the Court’s statement that while the 
“evidentiary gap perhaps could be filled by a remand to the district court 
for further factfinding” in “an ordinary case,” that will not work here 
because “when petitioner’s application was rejected, . . . the University’s 
combined percentage plan/holistic review approach to admission had been 
 
  93. Id.  
  94. Id. at 2223.  
  95. Id. at 2224.  
  96. Id.  
  97. Id. at 2225-26.  
  98. Id. at 2226.  
  99. Id.  
 100. Id. at 2230.  
 101. Id. at 2232.  
102. Id. at 2235.  
103. Id.  
104. Id. at 2239.  
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in effect for just three years.”105  Justice Alito went on to refute this 
statement by the Court saying that the “Equal Protection Clause does not 
provide a 3-year grace period for racial discrimination.”106  The Court 
erred, in his opinion, by being lenient with the interpretation of the Equal 
Protection Clause in light of the case at hand.  The second reason the 
Court went around the normal standard of review was because the 
University (in an attempt to excuse itself from having sufficient evidence) 
“had no reason to keep extensive data.”107  “This is not—as the Court 
claims—a ‘good-faith effort to comply with the law.’”108  The third reason 
given by Justice Alito was that the majority noted the fact that, in the time 
this issue had been litigated, the petitioner had already graduated from 
another school, and that this case may not offer much outlook for future 
cases of this matter.109  
 Justice Alito concluded his dissent by stating that what was “at 
stake” in Fisher was whether university authorities could justify using 
racial discrimination to serve the interest of promoting educational 
diversity without explaining why they must do so.110  Although the 
University never fully explained its reasoning for using discrimination on 
the basis of race and, even though its position relied on “a series of 
unsupported assumptions,” the majority concluded that it had met its 





 In Fisher, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals, which granted summary judgment in favor of the 
University and held that its admissions system did not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.112  A three-step analysis 
will be brought to light detailing the Equal Protection Clause, how the 
Court should have ruled in Fisher, and suggestions for the admissions 
system of the University in achieving its goals of invoking the 




105. Id.  
106. Id.  
107. Id.  
108. Id. at 2240.  
109. Id. at 2242.   
110. Id.  
111. Id. at 2243.  
112. Id. at 2207.  
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A. Was the Equal Protection Clause Violated? 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
addresses citizenship and the rights of citizens.113  Section One of the 
Fourteenth Amendment contains the Equal Protection Clause, which is 
itself at the heart of Fisher:  
 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.114 
 
The phrase “nor shall any state . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws” highlights the key concerns 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, demanding that the states must treat all 
individuals the same as others in similar circumstances.  The Equal 
Protection Clause is vital to the enforcement of civil rights of individuals.  
In Fisher’s case, she was not treated the same as all other applicants of the 
University, and she should have been granted relief under the Equal 
Protection Clause.  
In a nation where over half of the students in college are 
Caucasian, reviewing race as part of the admissions process would never 
help a Caucasian student gain admission, but it would almost always 
produce a negative effect.  The University of Texas, in promoting a 
“compelling interest” that resulted in increased levels of diversity, allowed 
the characteristic of race to be included in its admissions process.  
Although diversity, which cannot be measured, was cited as its primary 
goal, the University strategically ousted the efforts of an already heavily 
represented sector.  In essence, it justified its behavior, not by admitting 
the most academically and well-rounded students, but by punishing a 
group of students for the sole fact that they were born into the majority of 
the race which already made up over half of the college population.  
The Equal Protection Clause clearly states no state shall “deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”115 In 
reading this plainly, anyone could determine that if someone is treated 
 
113. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
114. Id.  
115. Id. 
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differently than another in similar circumstances, his or her rights under 
the Equal Protection Clause would be violated.  While there are ways to 
get around the strictness of the clause, it must first be determined whether 
the rights of Fisher and other Caucasian applicants were infringed upon.  
In the review of students’ applications that were not granted admission 
through the Top Ten Percent Plan, a factor of the application was the race 
of the applicant.116  The promotion of diversity can absolutely be 
understood and justified, but this does not bring forth the authority of a 
school to pick and choose its admitted students while considering their 
racial or ethnical background.  In order for the Equal Protection Clause to 
be honored to its fullest extent, race should not be considered in the 
admissions process of a university, as that would unfairly prejudice 
anyone who is a member of a race in which there is considered to be “too 
many of.”  Because race was a factor in the admissions process at the 
University, it can be stated with confidence that the school disadvantaged 
certain races and ethnic groups under the Equal Protection Clause—in 
fact, there was no equal protection at all.  
 
B. Analogy to Hopwood 
 
Fisher, while circumstantially different than that of the Hopwood 
case, should have been decided in the same manner, and Hopwood should 
still be good law today.  In Hopwood, a Caucasian female was denied 
admission to the University of Texas School of Law, despite being more 
academically qualified than most applicants in her year.117  It was 
ultimately ruled that the inclusion of race in the admissions process at the 
school violated the Equal Protection Clause, and that the inclusion of race 
should not be used as a way to “fix” bad minority community relations.118  
In Fisher, Ms. Fisher claimed she was disadvantaged because of the 
application process, which considered race as a subfactor in granting 
admission.119  The cases differ in the underlying situations surrounding 
the applicants who brought actions against their respective schools, but 
because of the possibilities presented by Hopwood, it should remain intact 
as a law in blanketed form.  
Hopwood presented the potential result of a university denying an 
academically strong student admission because of the inclusion of race in 
the admissions program.120  The plaintiff’s academic success was 
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ultimately undermined by her race, and that is not and should not be the 
intention of any institution.  Hopwood turns the focus on a student’s 
credentials and skillset, rather than factors concerning his or her race, 
which cannot be controlled.  For that reason, Fisher should have been 
ruled in the same manner as Hopwood.  Although the plaintiff in Fisher 
was not considered to be an academic superior, the ruling in that case set 
an unjust precedent that strayed from the court in Hopwood.  Had Ms. 
Fisher been strong academically, but not in the top ten percent of her 
class, she may still have not been granted admission because the school 
was using the representation of her race against her.  It is interesting to 
consider all of the possibilities in which Ms. Fisher could have been 
discriminated against in situations that were immeasurable and out of her 
control.  
This gray-area standard the University was using in its application 
review is a key reason why Hopwood should apply as a simple, blanketed 
law today.  It held, quite plainly, that the review of race in the admissions 
process violated the Equal Protection Clause.  Although this ruling may 
cause anger and uproar to some, it provides a clear basis for the standard 
at which an admissions program should be held—and in full transparency.  
When a university can tailor its program to meet immeasurable goals, it 
can potentially do anything with the program that its employees intend.  
 
C. Improvements to the Admissions Program 
  
When a university sets out to declare its main objective or set of 
objectives for its student body, the most important issue to decide upon is 
whether it will focus more on academic strength alone or a combination of 
academic strength and personal achievements.  Once this mission can be 
established, it can be easier to decide which kind of students will be 
granted admission to the institution.  In the case of the University, a 
combination of the two seems to be what is desired most.  
 The University’s current admissions system fills up to 75 percent 
of its incoming freshman class using the Top Ten Percent Plan.121  By 
doing this, it portrays that its focus with incoming classes is on academic 
success.  Where it could improve is in filling the remaining spots using the 
“Academic Index” and “Personal Achievement Index.”  The “Personal 
Achievement Index,” in order to align with the Equal Protection Clause, 
should completely exclude race from its list of components.  The best way 
to have equality in this country is to eliminate the racial lens which things 
are viewed through.  People shall be seen as people, as humans.  When 
one thinks of personal achievements, he or she thinks about experiences, 
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hobbies, talents, obstacles that have been overcome, and other things that 
have required initiative to complete.  The “Personal Achievement Index” 
should weigh all of these types of factors in students to find the ones who 
will bring the most diversity to the collegiate table because of their 
experiences in the extracurricular world.  It seems unfair to weigh the race 
of someone as a deciding factor in his or her admission, when he or she 
could just be viewed as a person with certain talents or capabilities.  As 
long as this country uses race as a reason to promote or demote a person, 
it will never be the land of the free.  We do not choose to be born into a 
certain race—it is given to us.  And for that reason, it should not limit 
anyone of any race from being what he or she wants to be, if his or her 
experiences can contribute to our society.  The University should mold its 
admissions program in a way that rewards academic success thus far, but 
also rewards experiences from extracurricular activities.  The Equal 




The Court in Fisher faced four arguments: (1) that the University 
had not sufficiently identified its compelling interests regarding its goals, 
(2) that the University had already “achieved critical mass” under its race-
holistic review, (3) that consideration of race was unnecessary because of 
its minor impact on the student body, and (4) that there were plenty of 
other race-neutral alternatives to achieve the University’s goals.122  
Affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the Court held: (1) that 
the University had sufficiently specified its compelling interests, (2) that 
the University had determined its goals had not quite been met, (3) that 
the University should continue reviewing race in order to continue 
narrowly tailor its interests, and (4) that none of the race-neutral 
alternatives suggested by Fisher were a workable means for the 
program.123 
In this Note, I argued that by reviewing race in its admissions 
process, the University violated the Equal Protection Clause.  I urged a 
plain reading of the phrase, “nor shall any state . . . deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” because it 
provides that every individual, no matter the circumstances, be granted the 
equal protection of this country’s laws.124  Fisher’s race was reviewed as a 
part of the admissions process and, because she was treated differently, 
she should have been granted relied under the Constitution.  The 
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University disadvantaged a handful of races and ethnic groups because it 
did not uphold the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause.  I argued that 
the Court should have ruled in a different manner—one more consistent 
with that of the Hopwood case, which I think should still be the precedent 
today.  Lastly, I suggested that in order to comply with the Equal 
Protection Clause, the University should completely exclude race from its 
review process.  Rather than looking at an applicant’s race, I asked that 
the University focus more on achievements that students can control, such 
as his or her academics and personal achievements outside of the 
classroom.  Diversity is a wonderful thing—however, a belief more in the 
diversity of a person’s dedication, academic success, hobbies, and unique 
abilities should be the factors that are weighed.  In doing this, diversity 
will be accomplished.  
While we are all different in many ways, the race into which 
someone is born into is not a choice.  Therefore, someone should not be 
held on a pedestal or given a special advantage for being born into a 
certain category.  Every person should be viewed as a human—and what 
each human accomplishes in his or her life should determine his or her 
potential.  For this reason, perhaps we should turn a blind eye to “check 
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